The Politics of Reincarnation

          The vast extant of the spiritual power of His Holiness the Dalai Lama [HHDL] was recently on display for all to see, when he visited various monasteries in Arunachal Pradesh. People came in huge numbers not only from local areas, but as far away as Bhutan and the Himalayan sub-region. No doubt that the Chinese would have taken due note, for no matter however much the Chinese authorities may have tried, the messages contained in HHDL’s sermons would have resonated with most of the Tibetan population in Tibet. And this is where the crux of the matter lies. No matter how much the Chinese authorities try, political repression or economic development, they have just not been able to shake the abiding faith of the Tibetans in the persona of HHDL. The Tibetans give to HHDL, a faith and a belief and trust that is unparalleled anywhere else in the world.

     The Chinese authorities realise that as HHDL advances in years, it is only a matter of time before they would be faced with the awkward dilemma of his reincarnation as the 15th Dalai Lama. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in a written response just last week, said that the reincarnation of the Dalai Lama should follow religious rituals, history rules and national regulations. The reincarnation of the Dalai Lama should be conducted according to tradition of drawing of lots in front of the Golden Urn Shakyamuni in Dachau Temple, Lhasa [Jokhang Monastery]. The Chinese Foreign Ministry made it unmistakably clear in various forums that the next Dalai Lama can only assume his role after their approval [emphasis added]; a practice that was established in 1793. The problem is that no one believes them nor would the Tibetans ever accept that the next Dalai Lama be approved by Beijing. Therefore an awkward situation may arise, when there maybe two Dalai Lamas; with no one paying any reverence to the Beijing approved one. It would indeed be a scathing loss of face for the Beijing authorities. It would seem that the Chinese authorities have already identified Gyaltsen Norbu [the Chinese appointed Panchen Lama] as a key player in the pivotal role of helping the Chinese authorities to impose the next Dalai Lama on the hapless Tibetans. On 10 June 2015, the Chinese President Xi Jinping received Gyaltsen Norbu at the Zhongnanhai, at which point the latter swore ‘undying loyalty’ to the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] as also to Xi personally. The CCP also issued a White Paper on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Tibetan Autonomous Region [TAR], in which it hopes of ‘identifying and appointing the 15th Dalai Lama’.

     The present HHDL is very firm on the question of the next Dalai Lama. He described the Chinese view point as “quite nonsense”. In a March interview with John Oliver of HBO, HHDL said “ As far as my own birth is concerned, the final authority is my say, no one else’s”. Earlier HHDL had issued a public statement on the issue on 24 September 2011, in which he explained the issue as follows:

       When I am about ninety, I will consult the high Lamas of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions, the Tibetan public and other concerned people who follow Tibetan Buddhism and re-evaluate whether the institution of the Dalai Lama should continue or not. On that basis we will take a decision. If it is decided that reincarnation of the Dalai Lama should continue and there is a need for the 15th Dalai Lama to be recognised, responsibility for doing so will primarily rest on the concerned officers of the Dalai Lama’s Phodrang Trust. They should consult various heads of the Tibetan Buddhist traditions and the reliable oath bound Dharma protectors who are linked inseparably to the lineage of the Dalai Lama. They should seek advice and direction from these concerned beings and carry out the procedures of search and recognition in accordance with tradition. I shall leave clear written instructions about this. Bear in mind that, apart from the reincarnation recognised through such legitimate methods, no recognition or acceptance to a candidate chosen for political ends, including those in the PRC.

     The Chinese certainly see that the issue of the next Dalai Lama will resonate in Sino-Indian relations. Although over the years, India has officially accepted that Tibet is an autonomous region of China, yet doubts about India’s intentions continue to linger in the Chinese mind. Even the Chinese military action in 1962 was attributed not to the legality or otherwise of the McMahon Line, but as Mao Zedung told a Nepalese delegation in 1964; to the fact that ‘in the opinion of the Indian government, Tibet is theirs.’ Further, China justified military action in 1962 by observing that ‘the Indian ruling circles had taken the mantle of the British Imperialists’ and had begun to ‘regard China’s Tibet as an Indian sphere of influence’ [emphasis added]. This Chinese paranoia about India’s intentions towards Tibet continues till present times, for whenever a Sino-Indian joint statement is envisaged, the Chinese insist that a sentence be incorporated stating that Tibet is a part of the People’s Republic of China. 

      Despite enormous efforts put in over the years, China has still not been able to pacify Tibetan aspirations for complete autonomy or even independence. China has tried everything from brutal crackdowns to economic sops and yet the Tibetan yearning for independence just has not died down to China’s utter exasperation. China faces a crisis of credibility in Tibet even after a half century of so-called ‘democratic reforms.’ Sometimes even Chinese officials, in candid moments, admit that although their economic strategies have been a success, yet their political strategy for ensuring stability has been a dismal failure. The Chinese received a rude awakening just prior to the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008, when extensive disturbances erupted in Tibet. The Tibetan protests in 2008 were the largest and most widespread since the exile of the Dalai Lama in 1959. Since 2009 over 150 Tibetans have self- immolated in protest against Chinese rule. Sometimes Tibetan protests are subtle, such as displaying pictures of the Dalai Lama in prayer rooms, writing protests in poetry and music  or turning towards the south [Dharamsala where the Dalai Lama resides], in the presence of Chinese officials, and bowing their heads in silent prayer. Nothing irritates Chinese officials more!

        China realises that the Sino-Indian boundary is in actual fact largely the Tibet-India boundary; except for a short length that abuts Xinjiang. There are no old Tibetan maps that show the southern boundary of Tibet with India! However much China may obfuscate the issue today, but for the period 1911 to 1951, China was totally absent from the scene and Tibet was independent all but in name. There was not a single Chinese soldier or administrator present in Tibet and that there was no effective Chinese control anywhere near the Tibet-India boundary. China is aware that the majority of the Tibetans still yearn for such a period to return. 

         History shows that Inner Asia with Tibet located at its strategic epicentre has suffered from periodical political upheavals. In the past, Tibetan cultural and religious influence in Central Asia was significant. This was largely excised through the persona of the Dalai Lama. The stage is thus set for a clash of wills for the selection of the next Dalai Lama. It promises to be a high stakes issue, in which India is bound to be heavily involved as an interested party. Apart from the obvious religious angle, India is bound to be as deeply involved as the Chinese, for it is quite possible that the next Dalai Lama may be reincarnated within the Tibetan community in India. After all it was the great 5th Dalai Lama that founded an important Monastery in Tawang that is connected to the famous Drepung Monastery in Lhasa!

The Dalai Lama in Arunachal: Why Are the Chinese So Angry?

           The recent visit of His Holiness the Dalai Lama [HHDL] to Arunachal Pradesh has brought forth a torrent of protests from Beijing; each becoming shriller by the day. A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswomen, Hua Chunying went so far as to say that HHDL’s visit had “severely damaged China’s interests and China-India relations” and further that “China expresses firm opposition to this visit and will lodge stern representations to the Indian side”. The Chinese press was no less virulent with the Global Times going so far as to say that “New Delhi may have under- estimated Beijing’s determination to safeguard core [emphasis added] interests…” The question is why is Beijing so deeply riled and its reaction so virulent and why has it taken such a hard line position? 

       There is no doubt that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of the Indian Union and as such HHDL is free to visit any apart of India, particularly if his mission is concerned with religious affairs. No government in India in the past has ever relented on this aspect, although sometimes discretion has been exercised. It would, however, be worthwhile also to examine the issue from China’s perspective; so as gain understanding on what can be expected from India’s northern neighbour, with whom we share a long and an un-demarcated Line of Actual Control [LAC] on our northern borders.

     It is not the first time that the Chinese have expressed their ire at HHDL’s visit to Arunachal Pradesh and particularly to Tawang. This is HHDL’s seventh visit. In the past Chinese protests have died down once the visit was over and things have returned to normal. The sensitivity of the Chinese to this territory and happenings there is also not of recent origin.As far back as 8 September 1959, PM Zhou wrote to Nehru that “this piece of territory corresponds in size to Chekiang province of China and is as big as 90,000 square kilometres. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal line that would have it relinquish its rights and disgrace itself by selling out its territory —and such a large piece at that?” If Mao and Zhou in 1959, at the height of their power, could not contemplate abandoning claims to NEFA [as it was then known] in favour of India unilaterally; it becomes exceedingly difficult for the present Chinese rulers to act otherwise. But much has happened since then and circumstances change as do policies.

   The present rulers of China base their acceptability and legitimacy to rule on the promise of rejuvenating China, both economically and politically and by stressing that never again would the Chinese people have to face a century of humiliation as they did in the past. The century of humiliation is the period commonly referred to from 1840 to 1949; when the People’s Republic was founded. The key point being that China is now politically united under a strong government and in economic terms it is the second largest economy in the world. It aspires to a status of equality with the US and be recognised along with the US as the two great powers of the day. Recently Fu Ying, the Chairperson of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress [NPC], speaking in the US had this to say about China's present attitude on territorial disputes.

       “China stumbled into the 20th Century with its capital under occupation of Imperialist armies and for over a century China suffered the humiliation of repeated foreign aggression and bullying. That is why the Chinese people are very sensitive about anything that is related to the loss of territory and would never allow such recurrence even if it is an inch of land [emphasis added]. This is something that the outside world needs to keep in mind when trying to understand Chinese behaviour.”

      The present Chinese leadership under President Xi Jinping faces multiple domestic challenges at home, as well as an uncertain US attitude on its eastern seaboard. Domestic challenges range from a slowing economy, an ageing population, wide income disparities and environmental degradation. The Chinese are unsure on whether Trump might push them towards a trade war; particularly since he refuses to back down on alleged Chinese currency manipulation and unfair trade practices. The Chinese leadership is also heading towards the 19th Party Congress later this autumn, where the leadership for the next five years is nominated/selected. Although Xi Jinping’s leadership is by no means under challenge, yet he cannot have his way in the run up to the Party Congress, unless he is seen to be a “strong” leader.

       Thus when the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs takes a stern position and its protests are rather virulent in tone; these are not only meant for India to contemplate, but are also designed to show the Chinese government’s domestic audience on how “tough” its stand has been on the issue of Chinese territorial integrity. The Chinese see the visit of HHDL to Arunachal Pradesh and particularly Tawang as a challenge to their territorial integrity. It is for this reason HHDL is dubbed as a “splitist” and they know that his visit even for religious purposes has political overtones that resonates amongst the people of the sub-Himalayan region.The Chinese leadership cannot afford to be seen as “weak” on a matter considered by them to be a core issue. Strategically it makes no sense for the Chinese to open yet another front on its South-Western borders at this stage, when it is faced with far more pressing issues on the South China Sea and on the issue of Taiwan. But there are limits to Chinese patience. We have to keep in mind that China’s economy is five times larger than India’s and its military expenditure three times as large. China is capable of initiating action in all five formats; land, sea, air, space and cyber.

    It is well within our sovereign rights to invite HHDL to visit any part of India, including Arunachal Pradesh. What we should be careful about is not to give un-necessary provocations to the Chinese while asserting our rights. And pique over the Chinese attitude to our membership of the NSG or the Chinese behaviour over Masood Azar are much better dealt with in other forums. It is in our strategic interest to see that the Sino-Indian border remains peaceful, as it has over the last several decades. 

Trump-Xi Summit:Chinese Grievances and Bargaining Chips

        On the eve of the meeting between President Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping; the Chinese delegation are bound to carry a long list of grievances against the US, but none stands out more starkly than the alleged widespread belief within Chinese governmental and society at large that US intentions were perverse and that its objective was to abort China’s rise, so as to prevent it from becoming a rich and a powerful first class world power. This effort was entirely due to the US desire to maintain its hegemony and global dominance. Chinese cynicism about US intentions has not abated since the assumption of power by President Trump, but has only exacerbated due to Trump’s inconsistent pronouncements, his blistering Twitter handouts and some of his bizarre pronouncements during the election campaign that seem to accompany him to the White House.

     The Chinese belief is that the main  objective of the US was to overthrow the Chinese social system and the rule of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP], so that China would once again become faction ridden, its society divided and thereby would be unable to continue down the path of rapid development and thus present no challenge to the US. The main instrument that the US was using was the issue of Human Rights in China, so as to create disorder and chaos and malign China’s image before the world. The US strategy of subverting rivals and bringing states under its domination, in Chinese eyes, had a proven record of success. The Chinese often cite as examples the events that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the “colour” revolutions of post Soviet Central Asia and the Arab Spring. The Chinese authorities are extremely suspicious and sensitive of the activities of several western sponsored NGOs, who they feel are only to happy to promote western “values” that undermine the cohesiveness of Chinese society.

       This sinister and cynical view of US policies may not be entirely without foundation. While the US has sought co-operation from China in areas of common interests in order to build a long term, stable and an amicable relationship; yet the US has tried to nudge China towards political liberalisation and ultimately a basic political change. Of course, this was couched in language to make China a “responsible stakeholder” and that the US was not intending to “weaken” China, but to make its government more responsible and accountable to its people. The US also tied to sell the idea that “relationships built on shared interests and shared values [emphasis added] are far more long lasting than those built on a coincidence of interests. Nevertheless while the US leadership continues to say that it welcomes China as a “prosperous and a successful” power, yet they also continue to seek “strategic reassurance” from China. In other words, largely maintain the status quo.

    What has added to Chinese perceptions about the malign intentions of the US, is the insistent belief that exists within Chinese society that China is intrinsically a peaceful, defence oriented and ethically minded state. The US in particular and the western powers are seen as intrinsically aggressive, militaristic and commercially selfish. Therefore since China cannot by its very cultural self perception give offence; conflicts with the US must therefore arise only as a consequence of US aggressiveness. While these perceptions may be very Confucian in thought, yet lingering Marxist thought also leads to the conclusion that the US is trying for world domination and that only China stands in its way.               

     Most Chinese are convinced that liberal democracy would not work for them. They saw that even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the western powers did not come to the assistance of the new Russia, but tried to curtail its power and damage its economy. Even where discontent exists in China, it does not get translated into a desire for a regime change. Take for example the year 2012. There were reportedly about 150,000 protests regarding state seizure of property, police brutality, environmental degradation, wage and pension disputes and official corruption, but the anger underlying these disputes did not translate into a demand for a regime change. Nonetheless, the CCP leaders seem transfixed that this might lead to a popular uprising against them. The CCP leadership is conscious that the ultimate arbiter of their fate remains the PLA and therefore nothing is done to undermine its credibility as a formidable fighting force. The PLA’s views are listened to as one of the determining factors when eventual policy formulations are made. Doubtless when Xi Jinping visits Trump, the PLA’s inputs would be decisive. The CCP leadership also knows that the only state capable of interfering in its internal affairs to cause significant disaffection is the US. The whole internal security apparatus in China seems designed to prevent such a happening.

      The main Chinese objective in the forthcoming talks would be to establish a kind of “parity” with the US, as also to seek “assurances” that the Trump Administration would not try to subvert their system, or to move away from the established policy of “One China”.  In order to achieve these goals the Chinese leadership had earlier conceptualised its ideas in an article entitled “Innovations in China’s Diplomatic Theory and Practice Under New Conditions” that was published as a signed article in Qiushi [Seeking Truth]. The main points were [a] A policy of non-conflict and non-confrontation. This policy requires the two sides to view each other’s strategic intentions in an objective and sensible way [b] Mutual respect. This requires the two sides to respect each other's choice of social system and development path, respect each other’s “core” interests and major concerns and [c] Win-Win cooperation.

     Of particular interest is the fact that Trump already seems to have conceded on Taiwan by reiterating the “One China” policy. The fact is that on Tibet the US clearly recognises Tibet as a part of the People’s Republic and ever since the Nixon visit in 1972 has shown no inclination to meddle in Tibet.The Chinese are aware and know this. It would be interesting to watch what the Chinese have in mind. By introducing Tibet as a “core” issue are the Chinese trying to extend the concept to mean a joint Sino-US co-operative effort for South Asia as also for the Af-Pak region? The US Ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley’s recent remark about the US playing a role to “de-escalate” Indo-Pak tensions, is a clear pointer that South Asia may also figure in the Trump-Xi Summit. The US too would have its own list of issues, not the least the North Korean nuclear issue which would probably be top of the agenda.

     The Chinese are also very wary of the demands that Trump might raise on economic issues. The huge US trade deficit, alleged Chinese currency manipulation, IPR and the bilateral Investment Treaty all are likely to be the focus of intense bargaining. No wonder this Summit has been dubbed as a transactional Summit. 

       As US press reports indicate the Chinese have been quick off their feet. The help received from Henry Kissinger has been invaluable. It was Kissinger who on a recent visit to Beijing help set-up the “special” Chinese link with the White House, by bye-passing all other departments of state. The fact that Trump chose his son-in -law, Jared Kushner to head the White House end of the link, shows the importance of the Sino-US relationship. There is no doubt that both sides are approaching the Summit with extreme care and by the indications available it promises to be a very transactional. Let us wait and see.

Dalai Lama's Escape to India on 31 March 1959

           About fifty eight years ago almost to the day, HH the Dalai Lama entered India through Khinzemane post situated on the McMahon Line that separates Tibet from India in what was then the centrally administered North East Frontier Agency [NEFA]. His journey was very hazardous, full of danger and it was indeed a miracle that he survived without being intercepted by the Chinese PLA. The Dalai Lama waited on the Tibetan side of the border for a day till he received confirmation that he would be granted asylum and on receipt he crossed over. There was never a doubt in PM Nehru's mind that the Dalai Lama should be granted asylum for there was deep revulsion within India at the way the Chinese had treated him. The Dalai Lama is revered by millions of Indians not only as the reincarnation of the previous thirteen Dalai Lamas, but also as the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara or Chen Rezig, the Bodhisattava of compassion. Apart from the Communist Party of India [CPI], all other political parties, the press and civil society supported Nehru's decision. Even the Chinese never objected to the grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama, for they too had granted KI Singh, a Nepalese dissident asylum.
       It was but to be expected that the Chinese would be livid at the developments in Tibet. The escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet advertised to the world the utter failure of Chinese policies towards Tibet. It was a serious blow to their prestige in the Afro-Asian world. Rather than look at the causes of the trouble within themselves, for it was the harsh policies that they followed that caused the rebellion to spread all over Tibet, the Chinese chose to put the blame on India and Nehru in particular. As the Guang Ming Ribao of 23 April 1959 warned 'There can be no greater tragedy than a miscalculation of the situation. If the Indian expansionists are seeking to pressure China, they have picked the wrong customer'. The Chinese followed this by a vituperative  personal attack on Nehru in a People's Daily article of 6 May 1959 entitled 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy'. The article was reportedly personally approved by Mao and an open indictment of Indian interference in Tibet's internal affairs.
      Recently a Chinese published account in 'Remembering Chairman Mao/Yi Mao Zhuxi' authored by Wu Lengxi [Beijing:Xinhua, 1995] p282 contains an interesting reference to Deng Xiaoping's speech delivered on 25 March 1959 in which he reportedly asserted that the Indian government and Nehru in particular were deeply involved in the rebellion in Lhasa, but that the time had yet not come to voice public criticism of India. Deng went on to say that 'when the time comes we will certainly settle accounts with them' [emphasis added]. What further irked and incensed the Chinese was the statement made by the Dalai Lama on arrival in India that 'ever since the Dalai Lama entered India at Khinzemene [emphasis added] he had experienced in full measure respect and hospitality extended by the people of Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA....and the government of India had spared no effort to make his journey through this extremely well administered part of India [emphasis added] as comfortable as possible'. These references by the Dalai Lama indicating that this area was a part of India, completely undercut the Chinese position on the boundary dispute with India. It well known that the Chinese position on the boundary dispute with India, is based entirely on the position taken by Tibet, for China by itself has no locus standii otherwise.
      If this episode is reviewed from the Chinese standpoint, there are certain apprehensions in their mind that perhaps can be understood. Firstly, from about 1956 the CIA had begun to stoke the fires of the Khampa rebellion in Tibet and between September 1957 and January 1960, the CIA made 19 airdrops of 47 trained Khampas along with arms well inside Tibet. Although the CIA was flying over India, it would be extremely naive to imagine that the Chinese did not suspect an Indian connivance with the CIA. Secondly, at the height of the Lhasa uprising Nehru decided to write to PM Zhou on 23 March 1959, giving in detail India's territorial claims both in the western and eastern sectors. The Chinese would have noticed that, at a moment of their greatest difficulty, Nehru was questioning  their control over the Tibet-Xinjiang road link through Aksai Chin.
     What followed thereafter is history and rather well known to bear repetition. Sino-Indian relations steadily deteriorated to the point that open hostilities broke out in 1962.

       The Dalai Lama has since never gone back to Tibet and continues to reside in exile at Dharamsala, India. He continues to be the centre of the Tibetan community and the person to whom the Tibetans look for guidance in practically all matters. The Tibetan people give to him a faith and a belief and a trust unparalleled in any other relationship. The Dalai Lama still retains the ability to initiate sufficient turmoil inside Tibet to cause the Chinese deep anxiety and anxious moments. The Dalai Lama's prestige in the Buddhist world and elsewhere continues to be high and polemical attacks on his persona by the Chinese authorities are seen by the Tibetans as contempt for their way of life and their dignity. Visitors to Lhasa even today report that Tibetans turn south, bow and offer salutations. This demonstration of faith is not lost on the sharp political mind of the Chinese rulers in Tibet. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the Chinese watch the Dalai Lama's every move, with careful consideration and are very wary and concerned at his potential for trouble. It is for this reason that they have taken such a strident stand on his forthcoming visit to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.
         
     
                  

China's Package Deals on Boundary Issue: Myth or Reality?

          

        One of the issues that has consistently aroused considerable interest, emotion and sometimes misperceptions, in the public mind, have been the reported offers of ‘package deals’ by China at various stages of the Sino-Indian Boundary negotiations. The latest variation of the ‘package deal’ was the reported ‘offer’ by Dai Bingguo, the former Chinese Special Representative for the boundary talks. In his interview to the Beijing based magazine China-India Dialogue on 2 March 2017, Dai said that ‘the disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction. The major reason that the boundary question persists is that China’s reasonable requests have not been met. If the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns in the eastern sector of their border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s concerns elsewhere’.

      It must be noted, however, that this Dai interview is not a Chinese government initiative, but a private one since Dai does not hold any official position anymore; albeit his 'offer' may have been with the knowledge and encouragement of the Chinese government. Therefore Dai is in a sense testing the waters, without putting the prestige of the Chinese government or association on line. That this was not the first such offer of a ‘package deal’ is also fairly obvious, for in the past, several variations have been on the table.

     To recollect from historical record, the first such offer of a ‘package deal’ was reportedly made by PM Zhou Enlai when he came to Delhi in April 1960. There is considerable confusion as to whether he actually made such an offer. According to Chinese writings on the subject, Zhou in his first meeting with PM Nehru stated that although the area south of the McMahon Line was once a part of Tibet, China would not raise ‘new’ demands, but be ‘practical’. In the sixth meeting, Zhou proposed that China would recognize the line reached by India’s administrative jurisdiction in the eastern sector, if India did the same in the western sector. This perhaps was the genesis of the ‘package deal’ referred to by the Chinese. Further the records of the Zhou-Nehru meeting show that Zhou made two important points. Firstly, he said that ‘we do not recognize the McMahon Line but are willing to take a realistic view’ and that ‘we would not cross it’ and secondly that ‘we do not put forward any territorial claim south of the McMahon Line’ [emphasis added].[1]

   There is added confirmation that perhaps a package offer was made by Zhou in that the then Foreign Secretary Dutt informed Indian Missions after Zhou’s visit that:

      It is quite obvious that the Chinese aim was to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for the recognition of our position in NEFA….it was also obvious that if we accepted the line claimed by China in Ladakh they would accept the McMahon Line.

These of course are Foreign Secretary Dutt’s observations and surmise, for it does not specifically state whether such an offer was actually made. It should also be kept in mind that only a few months earlier [8 September 1959], Zhou had written officially to Nehru categorically stating that ‘this piece of territory [NEFA] corresponds in size to Chekiang province of China and is as big as 90,000 square kilometers. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal Line…and disgrace itself by selling out its territory’? So what was Zhou actually trying to convey to Nehru? It is not entirely clear.

    The next occasion that the question of a ‘package deal’ surfaces is when FM Vajpayee met the then Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping in February 1979 and the latter once again put forward the proposal. This was followed by an interview that Deng gave to an Indian journalist Krishna Kant [Chief Editor of Vikrant] on 21 June 1980 in which Deng reiterated the need to settle the boundary in a ‘package way…I mean according to the Line of Actual Control.’

   When the first round meeting of the renewed Sino-Indian boundary talks commenced in Beijing from 10-14 December 1980, the Chinese once again put forward the ‘package proposal,’ a settlement essentially based on the Line of Actual Control. But when the Indian side requested for a cartographic examination, the Chinese side demurred and refused. This led to the suspicion that the Chinese offer was ‘non-serious’ and FM Rao accordingly informed Parliament that ‘the government of India never accepted the premise on which it [the package proposal] is based…’ That position remained till the Chinese, once again, re-interrupted the offer.

   At the sixth round of the boundary talks in November 1985 at New Delhi, the Chinese came out with yet another version of the ‘package deal’. The new proposal was that if India gave ‘concessions’ in the Eastern sector, the Chinese in turn would give corresponding ‘concessions’ in the Western sector. When pressed as where these ‘concessions’ in the Eastern sector were to be given, the extent of the area to be given; the Chinese demurred and refused and fell back on the plea that India would first have to accept the principle and then only would their clarification follow. Hardly a basis on which negotiations can proceed! But perhaps is that what the Chinese wanted?

  In the Special Representative talks that followed PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, both sides negotiated and signed on 11 April 2005 the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question’. Article VII is most important. It states quite clearly that:

      In reaching a border settlement the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in border areas. 

Dai Bingguo, then China’s Special Representative, was a party to this agreement having negotiated and signed it on behalf of China. Is the language and meaning not clear; for it says quite categorically that ‘settled populations’ would be ‘safeguarded’? Is the Tawang area not a settled area with a sizeable population?   

     As can be seen from records indicated above that China’s position on this issue has been changing, just as its political and strategic objectives have changed. From PM Zhou’s assertion in 1960 that China had no territorial claims south of the McMahon Line, we are now receiving feelers from Dai Bingguo that cessation of the Tawang area is the price for a settlement.  Perhaps the Chinese sense that there is a constituency in India that ardently wishes for a boundary settlement. The government of India should make it clear that Arunachal Pradesh is a constituent state of the Indian Union and that there is no question of cessation of any territory, apart from minor rectifications along the McMahon alignment [emphasis added].

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[i] Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [SWJN], Vol 60, p 34

        

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How Arunachal Pradesh Became a Full Member of the Indian Union.-- Part II

                                                               PART ---II


                                   International Reaction and Role of the Great Powers
                                                              


           The Indian leadership was quite aware that the developing confrontation at the borders with China [Sumdorong Chu/Wangdung] would not only inevitably draw the attention of the great powers, but that their attitude would influence the outcome in a demonstrable manner. The two great powers, the US and the Soviet Union, watched with increasing alarm as it seemed that India and China were headed for a military clash. Their main concern was that they might get sucked into the looming conflict, which it was clear from the very beginning, that both were very determined to avoid. Pakistan had reasons to believe that this might spill over to involve them as well.

    Let us examine US policy first. The US had recognized the McMahon Line as the international boundary between India and China in a formal note sent to India on 26 October 1962 [Note: the US takes no position on the western sector]. This action proverbially drew an angry response from the Chinese government. As both China and the US had no diplomatic relations at that point in time, Chinese Ambassador Wang remonstrated bitterly about this change of position to his US interlocutor, Ambassador Cabot at their meeting in Warsaw [Poland] on 13 December 1962. Since then not only had President Nixon visited China and opened the way for normalization of relations, but by the early 1980s, both were on the same page on larger strategic issues; including intense opposition to the Soviet Union. It became apparent very early on that the US would not like to take sides and particularly not jeopardize its newly established bon homie with China. Throughout the period of the Sino-Indian confrontation, the US never publicly reiterated that the McMahon Line was the international boundary between India and China. When President Reagan met PM Rajiv Gandhi on 19-20 October 1987, the former never mentioned a word about the Sumdorong Chu stand-off, nor did he forward any “messages” from the Chinese government. It was obvious that the US did not wish to take sides.

    Earlier US intelligence had become aware that China was increasing its assistance to Pakistan to help develop its nuclear weapon systems. Beginning mid- 1982, Pakistan began enriching weapons grade uranium using uranium hexafluoride supplied by China. Giving in to President Zia’s entireties, Deng Xiaoping in a surprising move, approved the request for 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium along with a blueprint for an atomic bomb devise, already tested by China. All these were carried by a Pakistani C-130 cargo aircraft from China to Pakistan. The US despite full knowledge of this transaction, felt the need to look the other way, due its expectations for continuing Chinese and Pakistani cooperation to sustain anti-Soviet positions, particularly in Afghanistan.* Even in such a sensitive matter as nuclear proliferation, the US was keen not to antagonize China.

     Take the case of the other great power—the Soviet Union. Ever since Gorbachov became the Soviet leader, he was keen to establish warm friendly relations with China. In a major speech at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, Gorbachov accepted the thalweg principle [mid channel] for the Sino-Soviet river boundary, but also announced the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan and the thinning out of troops from Mongolia. The Chinese were keen to test Soviet sincerity and for which the Sumdorong stand-off came in rather handy. The Chinese made it clear in Moscow that if the Soviets supported India, Sino-Soviet normalization could not advance. Thus when the initial reports of the Sino-Indian confrontation came in; there was total silence from Moscow. Even during the 15^th anniversary celebrations of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on 9 August 1986, the Soviet representative feigned total ignorance of the ensuing confrontation.

    Gorbachov arrived in India in November 1986 ostensibly to reassure India. However in his public statements, Gorbachov pleaded ignorance about the Sumdorong Chu incident, but insisted that better relations between India, China and the Soviet Union would be best if “no one had to choose sides”. Privately, Gorbachov assured the Indian leadership that the Soviet Union would not stand “idly by” if India’s unity and integrity was threatened, but never clarified that if clashes took place with China on the McMahon Line, whether these constituted threats to India’s “unity and integrity”.  The Soviets were keen to pursue a policy of strategic ambiguity. It did not go un- noticed in Delhi that when the confrontation with China was at its height, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced in January 1987, the imminent withdrawal of a Soviet mechanized division from Mongolia.

    The Chinese also tried to escalate the political confrontation by sending Qiao Shi, a Politburo Standing Committee member to Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh in March 1987. The aim of the visits was to persuade these countries to minimize support for India in the event of a border clash. The Chinese tried very hard to pressurize President Ershad of Bangladesh, not to permit the movement of Indian troops and material across Bangladesh territory in the event of a Sino-Indian clash. A month later, Ershad visited Beijing and according to press reports acceded to the Chinese request.**  

    The political lesson of the confrontation at Sumdorong Chu was quite clear for both India and China. If a military confrontation were to ensue, both would find themselves largely on their own, bereft of any great power support. Both would have suffered substantial setbacks and thus the realization dawned that there was little to be gained from a military confrontation. It was this realization that eventually paved the way for a de-escalation on the boundary and thereafter to a momentous decision taken by PM Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in December 1988. It would be the first visit by an Indian PM to China since Nehru’s visit in 1954. This also led to a change of tactics and policy by India. The new policy was of trying to minimize differences with China, while at the same time seeking to enlarge cooperation in all other areas. China too still recovering from the intense political backlash and facing isolation generated by the Tienanmen incidents, embraced this policy then. The success of this new policy can be seen that since then there has been not a single shot fired on the Sino-Indian border and that there has been no large scale military confrontation either. It remains largely a peaceful border.        

 

 

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*John Garver, China’s Quest [New York: OUP, 2016], p 439.

** Ibid, p 443       

How Arunachal Pradesh Became a Full Member of the Indian Union-Part I

    

       A few days ago the 31^st Anniversary [1986] of the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a full- fledged state of the Indian Union was celebrated with much enthusiasm and acclaim, but its birth was accompanied by high end tension in Sino-Indian relations and what its establishment also demonstrated was that a substantive shift in great power relations had also occurred.

     North East Frontier Agency [NEFA] as the territory was then known was a Union Territory and subject to substantive sovereignty claims by China over large tracts, amounting to nearly 90,000 square kilometers. Although in 1914 at the tripartite Simla Convention [India, Tibet and China] the McMahon Line separating Tibet from India had been agreed upon, China insisted that it had never agreed to the McMahon Line. Yet from that point onwards in time till 23 January 1959, the Chinese government, in any official document, never challenged the McMahon Line. Even when Major Khating evicted the last of the Tibetans from Tawang on 12 February 1951, there was no protest from the Chinese government. In his letter to Nehru, PM Zhou Enlai on 23 January 1959 affirmed that “the Chinese government finds it necessary to take a realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line”. But times change and so do policies. Let us fast forward to the early 1980s.

    In early 1980s PM Indira Gandhi took the decision that Indian security forces were to patrol right up to the McMahon Line so as to eliminate any chance of incursions across the line. A small detachment began patrolling the area from the summer of 1982. There were no Chinese protests when movement by Indian personnel was made in 1983 and on 28 July 1984 a seasonal post was established. However in 1986 when Indian personnel similarly moved up to the post after the winter was over, they found 40 Chinese personnel already encamped there and were soon reinforced by about 200 PLA soldiers. From 26 June 1986 onwards, a bitter exchange of protests took place, but a solution was not forthcoming. India was clearly alarmed at this new found Chinese aggressiveness coming as it did after Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liu Shuqing told us at the 6^th Round of Boundary talks in November 1985 that “India would have to give concessions in the eastern sector and China would do so in the western sector”. What these concessions were was not amplified at that time.

     Clearly recognizing the gravity of the situation the Indian Army moved quickly and in strength and between 18^th and 20^th October 1986 occupied the Hathungla Ridge above the Sumdorong Chu, overlooking the Chinese positions. A full strength brigade was deployed. Unlike the mistakes of 1962, the Indian troops never tried to hold the river line, but stood firm on high ground. By the time the Chinese crossed the Sumdorong Chu and moved forward they found well entrenched Indian troops on the ridge line. The Chinese could neither go forward nor could they retreat, for a retreat would have been rather galling. Similarly Indian troops moved with speed and alacrity and deployed Tanks both in Ladakh and north Sikkim. Clearly the Chinese had not anticipated such moves and attempted bluster in the hope that the new Indian leadership of PM Rajiv Gandhi might wilt.

    On 15^th November 1986 the Chinese sought a flag meeting in which it was agreed that force would not be used and that both sides would seek a “political solution”. Having successfully held the Chinese, the Indian side detected an opening that they had been looking for to convert Arunachal Pradesh from a Union Territory to a full- fledged state of the Indian Union. Earlier there had been apprehension that if India did so the Chinese reaction might be violent and therefore this factor had to be taken into account. The government of India now moved with speed and alacrity and after all legal formalities were completed, the new state of Arunachal Pradesh as a constituent of the Indian Union came into being in February 1987. A forceful message had been sent to the Chinese.

   As anticipated the Chinese reacted with verbal rage, but could not do much more as the Indian army was already fully deployed and ready at the borders. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] issued a strong protest stating that “the establishment of an Indian state on Chinese territory illegally occupied constituted serious aggression against China’s sovereignty and deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and that China would never recognize the so-called Arunachal Pradesh”. This high voltage reaction clearly indicated that their annoyance with India was at its peak, for being out maneuvered both politically and militarily. It was noticed from reports that the Chinese Military Attaché in Delhi, the Tibet District Military Commander and the Chengdu Regional Military Commander were all transferred; perhaps for misreading the situation. It was under these circumstances that the new state of Arunachal Pradesh was born as a full member of the Indian Union.  

  [ In Part-II the international reactions and policies of the then two great powers, the US and the then Soviet Union would be explained.]