Dalai Lama's Escape to India on 31 March 1959

           About fifty eight years ago almost to the day, HH the Dalai Lama entered India through Khinzemane post situated on the McMahon Line that separates Tibet from India in what was then the centrally administered North East Frontier Agency [NEFA]. His journey was very hazardous, full of danger and it was indeed a miracle that he survived without being intercepted by the Chinese PLA. The Dalai Lama waited on the Tibetan side of the border for a day till he received confirmation that he would be granted asylum and on receipt he crossed over. There was never a doubt in PM Nehru's mind that the Dalai Lama should be granted asylum for there was deep revulsion within India at the way the Chinese had treated him. The Dalai Lama is revered by millions of Indians not only as the reincarnation of the previous thirteen Dalai Lamas, but also as the reincarnation of Avalokiteshvara or Chen Rezig, the Bodhisattava of compassion. Apart from the Communist Party of India [CPI], all other political parties, the press and civil society supported Nehru's decision. Even the Chinese never objected to the grant of asylum to the Dalai Lama, for they too had granted KI Singh, a Nepalese dissident asylum.
       It was but to be expected that the Chinese would be livid at the developments in Tibet. The escape of the Dalai Lama from Tibet advertised to the world the utter failure of Chinese policies towards Tibet. It was a serious blow to their prestige in the Afro-Asian world. Rather than look at the causes of the trouble within themselves, for it was the harsh policies that they followed that caused the rebellion to spread all over Tibet, the Chinese chose to put the blame on India and Nehru in particular. As the Guang Ming Ribao of 23 April 1959 warned 'There can be no greater tragedy than a miscalculation of the situation. If the Indian expansionists are seeking to pressure China, they have picked the wrong customer'. The Chinese followed this by a vituperative  personal attack on Nehru in a People's Daily article of 6 May 1959 entitled 'The Revolution in Tibet and Nehru's Philosophy'. The article was reportedly personally approved by Mao and an open indictment of Indian interference in Tibet's internal affairs.
      Recently a Chinese published account in 'Remembering Chairman Mao/Yi Mao Zhuxi' authored by Wu Lengxi [Beijing:Xinhua, 1995] p282 contains an interesting reference to Deng Xiaoping's speech delivered on 25 March 1959 in which he reportedly asserted that the Indian government and Nehru in particular were deeply involved in the rebellion in Lhasa, but that the time had yet not come to voice public criticism of India. Deng went on to say that 'when the time comes we will certainly settle accounts with them' [emphasis added]. What further irked and incensed the Chinese was the statement made by the Dalai Lama on arrival in India that 'ever since the Dalai Lama entered India at Khinzemene [emphasis added] he had experienced in full measure respect and hospitality extended by the people of Kameng Frontier Division of NEFA....and the government of India had spared no effort to make his journey through this extremely well administered part of India [emphasis added] as comfortable as possible'. These references by the Dalai Lama indicating that this area was a part of India, completely undercut the Chinese position on the boundary dispute with India. It well known that the Chinese position on the boundary dispute with India, is based entirely on the position taken by Tibet, for China by itself has no locus standii otherwise.
      If this episode is reviewed from the Chinese standpoint, there are certain apprehensions in their mind that perhaps can be understood. Firstly, from about 1956 the CIA had begun to stoke the fires of the Khampa rebellion in Tibet and between September 1957 and January 1960, the CIA made 19 airdrops of 47 trained Khampas along with arms well inside Tibet. Although the CIA was flying over India, it would be extremely naive to imagine that the Chinese did not suspect an Indian connivance with the CIA. Secondly, at the height of the Lhasa uprising Nehru decided to write to PM Zhou on 23 March 1959, giving in detail India's territorial claims both in the western and eastern sectors. The Chinese would have noticed that, at a moment of their greatest difficulty, Nehru was questioning  their control over the Tibet-Xinjiang road link through Aksai Chin.
     What followed thereafter is history and rather well known to bear repetition. Sino-Indian relations steadily deteriorated to the point that open hostilities broke out in 1962.

       The Dalai Lama has since never gone back to Tibet and continues to reside in exile at Dharamsala, India. He continues to be the centre of the Tibetan community and the person to whom the Tibetans look for guidance in practically all matters. The Tibetan people give to him a faith and a belief and a trust unparalleled in any other relationship. The Dalai Lama still retains the ability to initiate sufficient turmoil inside Tibet to cause the Chinese deep anxiety and anxious moments. The Dalai Lama's prestige in the Buddhist world and elsewhere continues to be high and polemical attacks on his persona by the Chinese authorities are seen by the Tibetans as contempt for their way of life and their dignity. Visitors to Lhasa even today report that Tibetans turn south, bow and offer salutations. This demonstration of faith is not lost on the sharp political mind of the Chinese rulers in Tibet. Therefore it comes as no surprise that the Chinese watch the Dalai Lama's every move, with careful consideration and are very wary and concerned at his potential for trouble. It is for this reason that they have taken such a strident stand on his forthcoming visit to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh.
         
     
                  

China's Package Deals on Boundary Issue: Myth or Reality?

          

        One of the issues that has consistently aroused considerable interest, emotion and sometimes misperceptions, in the public mind, have been the reported offers of ‘package deals’ by China at various stages of the Sino-Indian Boundary negotiations. The latest variation of the ‘package deal’ was the reported ‘offer’ by Dai Bingguo, the former Chinese Special Representative for the boundary talks. In his interview to the Beijing based magazine China-India Dialogue on 2 March 2017, Dai said that ‘the disputed territory in the eastern sector of the China-India boundary, including Tawang, is inalienable from China’s Tibet in terms of cultural background and administrative jurisdiction. The major reason that the boundary question persists is that China’s reasonable requests have not been met. If the Indian side takes care of China’s concerns in the eastern sector of their border, the Chinese side will respond accordingly and address India’s concerns elsewhere’.

      It must be noted, however, that this Dai interview is not a Chinese government initiative, but a private one since Dai does not hold any official position anymore; albeit his 'offer' may have been with the knowledge and encouragement of the Chinese government. Therefore Dai is in a sense testing the waters, without putting the prestige of the Chinese government or association on line. That this was not the first such offer of a ‘package deal’ is also fairly obvious, for in the past, several variations have been on the table.

     To recollect from historical record, the first such offer of a ‘package deal’ was reportedly made by PM Zhou Enlai when he came to Delhi in April 1960. There is considerable confusion as to whether he actually made such an offer. According to Chinese writings on the subject, Zhou in his first meeting with PM Nehru stated that although the area south of the McMahon Line was once a part of Tibet, China would not raise ‘new’ demands, but be ‘practical’. In the sixth meeting, Zhou proposed that China would recognize the line reached by India’s administrative jurisdiction in the eastern sector, if India did the same in the western sector. This perhaps was the genesis of the ‘package deal’ referred to by the Chinese. Further the records of the Zhou-Nehru meeting show that Zhou made two important points. Firstly, he said that ‘we do not recognize the McMahon Line but are willing to take a realistic view’ and that ‘we would not cross it’ and secondly that ‘we do not put forward any territorial claim south of the McMahon Line’ [emphasis added].[1]

   There is added confirmation that perhaps a package offer was made by Zhou in that the then Foreign Secretary Dutt informed Indian Missions after Zhou’s visit that:

      It is quite obvious that the Chinese aim was to make us accept their claim in Ladakh as a price for the recognition of our position in NEFA….it was also obvious that if we accepted the line claimed by China in Ladakh they would accept the McMahon Line.

These of course are Foreign Secretary Dutt’s observations and surmise, for it does not specifically state whether such an offer was actually made. It should also be kept in mind that only a few months earlier [8 September 1959], Zhou had written officially to Nehru categorically stating that ‘this piece of territory [NEFA] corresponds in size to Chekiang province of China and is as big as 90,000 square kilometers. Mr. Prime Minister, how could China agree to accept under coercion such an illegal Line…and disgrace itself by selling out its territory’? So what was Zhou actually trying to convey to Nehru? It is not entirely clear.

    The next occasion that the question of a ‘package deal’ surfaces is when FM Vajpayee met the then Chinese leader, Deng Xiaoping in February 1979 and the latter once again put forward the proposal. This was followed by an interview that Deng gave to an Indian journalist Krishna Kant [Chief Editor of Vikrant] on 21 June 1980 in which Deng reiterated the need to settle the boundary in a ‘package way…I mean according to the Line of Actual Control.’

   When the first round meeting of the renewed Sino-Indian boundary talks commenced in Beijing from 10-14 December 1980, the Chinese once again put forward the ‘package proposal,’ a settlement essentially based on the Line of Actual Control. But when the Indian side requested for a cartographic examination, the Chinese side demurred and refused. This led to the suspicion that the Chinese offer was ‘non-serious’ and FM Rao accordingly informed Parliament that ‘the government of India never accepted the premise on which it [the package proposal] is based…’ That position remained till the Chinese, once again, re-interrupted the offer.

   At the sixth round of the boundary talks in November 1985 at New Delhi, the Chinese came out with yet another version of the ‘package deal’. The new proposal was that if India gave ‘concessions’ in the Eastern sector, the Chinese in turn would give corresponding ‘concessions’ in the Western sector. When pressed as where these ‘concessions’ in the Eastern sector were to be given, the extent of the area to be given; the Chinese demurred and refused and fell back on the plea that India would first have to accept the principle and then only would their clarification follow. Hardly a basis on which negotiations can proceed! But perhaps is that what the Chinese wanted?

  In the Special Representative talks that followed PM Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003, both sides negotiated and signed on 11 April 2005 the ‘Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for the Settlement of the Boundary Question’. Article VII is most important. It states quite clearly that:

      In reaching a border settlement the two sides shall safeguard due interests of their settled populations in border areas. 

Dai Bingguo, then China’s Special Representative, was a party to this agreement having negotiated and signed it on behalf of China. Is the language and meaning not clear; for it says quite categorically that ‘settled populations’ would be ‘safeguarded’? Is the Tawang area not a settled area with a sizeable population?   

     As can be seen from records indicated above that China’s position on this issue has been changing, just as its political and strategic objectives have changed. From PM Zhou’s assertion in 1960 that China had no territorial claims south of the McMahon Line, we are now receiving feelers from Dai Bingguo that cessation of the Tawang area is the price for a settlement.  Perhaps the Chinese sense that there is a constituency in India that ardently wishes for a boundary settlement. The government of India should make it clear that Arunachal Pradesh is a constituent state of the Indian Union and that there is no question of cessation of any territory, apart from minor rectifications along the McMahon alignment [emphasis added].

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[i] Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru [SWJN], Vol 60, p 34

        

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How Arunachal Pradesh Became a Full Member of the Indian Union.-- Part II

                                                               PART ---II


                                   International Reaction and Role of the Great Powers
                                                              


           The Indian leadership was quite aware that the developing confrontation at the borders with China [Sumdorong Chu/Wangdung] would not only inevitably draw the attention of the great powers, but that their attitude would influence the outcome in a demonstrable manner. The two great powers, the US and the Soviet Union, watched with increasing alarm as it seemed that India and China were headed for a military clash. Their main concern was that they might get sucked into the looming conflict, which it was clear from the very beginning, that both were very determined to avoid. Pakistan had reasons to believe that this might spill over to involve them as well.

    Let us examine US policy first. The US had recognized the McMahon Line as the international boundary between India and China in a formal note sent to India on 26 October 1962 [Note: the US takes no position on the western sector]. This action proverbially drew an angry response from the Chinese government. As both China and the US had no diplomatic relations at that point in time, Chinese Ambassador Wang remonstrated bitterly about this change of position to his US interlocutor, Ambassador Cabot at their meeting in Warsaw [Poland] on 13 December 1962. Since then not only had President Nixon visited China and opened the way for normalization of relations, but by the early 1980s, both were on the same page on larger strategic issues; including intense opposition to the Soviet Union. It became apparent very early on that the US would not like to take sides and particularly not jeopardize its newly established bon homie with China. Throughout the period of the Sino-Indian confrontation, the US never publicly reiterated that the McMahon Line was the international boundary between India and China. When President Reagan met PM Rajiv Gandhi on 19-20 October 1987, the former never mentioned a word about the Sumdorong Chu stand-off, nor did he forward any “messages” from the Chinese government. It was obvious that the US did not wish to take sides.

    Earlier US intelligence had become aware that China was increasing its assistance to Pakistan to help develop its nuclear weapon systems. Beginning mid- 1982, Pakistan began enriching weapons grade uranium using uranium hexafluoride supplied by China. Giving in to President Zia’s entireties, Deng Xiaoping in a surprising move, approved the request for 50 kilograms of highly enriched uranium along with a blueprint for an atomic bomb devise, already tested by China. All these were carried by a Pakistani C-130 cargo aircraft from China to Pakistan. The US despite full knowledge of this transaction, felt the need to look the other way, due its expectations for continuing Chinese and Pakistani cooperation to sustain anti-Soviet positions, particularly in Afghanistan.* Even in such a sensitive matter as nuclear proliferation, the US was keen not to antagonize China.

     Take the case of the other great power—the Soviet Union. Ever since Gorbachov became the Soviet leader, he was keen to establish warm friendly relations with China. In a major speech at Vladivostok on 28 July 1986, Gorbachov accepted the thalweg principle [mid channel] for the Sino-Soviet river boundary, but also announced the withdrawal of six regiments from Afghanistan and the thinning out of troops from Mongolia. The Chinese were keen to test Soviet sincerity and for which the Sumdorong stand-off came in rather handy. The Chinese made it clear in Moscow that if the Soviets supported India, Sino-Soviet normalization could not advance. Thus when the initial reports of the Sino-Indian confrontation came in; there was total silence from Moscow. Even during the 15^th anniversary celebrations of the Indo-Soviet Treaty on 9 August 1986, the Soviet representative feigned total ignorance of the ensuing confrontation.

    Gorbachov arrived in India in November 1986 ostensibly to reassure India. However in his public statements, Gorbachov pleaded ignorance about the Sumdorong Chu incident, but insisted that better relations between India, China and the Soviet Union would be best if “no one had to choose sides”. Privately, Gorbachov assured the Indian leadership that the Soviet Union would not stand “idly by” if India’s unity and integrity was threatened, but never clarified that if clashes took place with China on the McMahon Line, whether these constituted threats to India’s “unity and integrity”.  The Soviets were keen to pursue a policy of strategic ambiguity. It did not go un- noticed in Delhi that when the confrontation with China was at its height, the Soviet Foreign Ministry announced in January 1987, the imminent withdrawal of a Soviet mechanized division from Mongolia.

    The Chinese also tried to escalate the political confrontation by sending Qiao Shi, a Politburo Standing Committee member to Nepal, Myanmar and Bangladesh in March 1987. The aim of the visits was to persuade these countries to minimize support for India in the event of a border clash. The Chinese tried very hard to pressurize President Ershad of Bangladesh, not to permit the movement of Indian troops and material across Bangladesh territory in the event of a Sino-Indian clash. A month later, Ershad visited Beijing and according to press reports acceded to the Chinese request.**  

    The political lesson of the confrontation at Sumdorong Chu was quite clear for both India and China. If a military confrontation were to ensue, both would find themselves largely on their own, bereft of any great power support. Both would have suffered substantial setbacks and thus the realization dawned that there was little to be gained from a military confrontation. It was this realization that eventually paved the way for a de-escalation on the boundary and thereafter to a momentous decision taken by PM Rajiv Gandhi to visit China in December 1988. It would be the first visit by an Indian PM to China since Nehru’s visit in 1954. This also led to a change of tactics and policy by India. The new policy was of trying to minimize differences with China, while at the same time seeking to enlarge cooperation in all other areas. China too still recovering from the intense political backlash and facing isolation generated by the Tienanmen incidents, embraced this policy then. The success of this new policy can be seen that since then there has been not a single shot fired on the Sino-Indian border and that there has been no large scale military confrontation either. It remains largely a peaceful border.        

 

 

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*John Garver, China’s Quest [New York: OUP, 2016], p 439.

** Ibid, p 443       

How Arunachal Pradesh Became a Full Member of the Indian Union-Part I

    

       A few days ago the 31^st Anniversary [1986] of the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a full- fledged state of the Indian Union was celebrated with much enthusiasm and acclaim, but its birth was accompanied by high end tension in Sino-Indian relations and what its establishment also demonstrated was that a substantive shift in great power relations had also occurred.

     North East Frontier Agency [NEFA] as the territory was then known was a Union Territory and subject to substantive sovereignty claims by China over large tracts, amounting to nearly 90,000 square kilometers. Although in 1914 at the tripartite Simla Convention [India, Tibet and China] the McMahon Line separating Tibet from India had been agreed upon, China insisted that it had never agreed to the McMahon Line. Yet from that point onwards in time till 23 January 1959, the Chinese government, in any official document, never challenged the McMahon Line. Even when Major Khating evicted the last of the Tibetans from Tawang on 12 February 1951, there was no protest from the Chinese government. In his letter to Nehru, PM Zhou Enlai on 23 January 1959 affirmed that “the Chinese government finds it necessary to take a realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line”. But times change and so do policies. Let us fast forward to the early 1980s.

    In early 1980s PM Indira Gandhi took the decision that Indian security forces were to patrol right up to the McMahon Line so as to eliminate any chance of incursions across the line. A small detachment began patrolling the area from the summer of 1982. There were no Chinese protests when movement by Indian personnel was made in 1983 and on 28 July 1984 a seasonal post was established. However in 1986 when Indian personnel similarly moved up to the post after the winter was over, they found 40 Chinese personnel already encamped there and were soon reinforced by about 200 PLA soldiers. From 26 June 1986 onwards, a bitter exchange of protests took place, but a solution was not forthcoming. India was clearly alarmed at this new found Chinese aggressiveness coming as it did after Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liu Shuqing told us at the 6^th Round of Boundary talks in November 1985 that “India would have to give concessions in the eastern sector and China would do so in the western sector”. What these concessions were was not amplified at that time.

     Clearly recognizing the gravity of the situation the Indian Army moved quickly and in strength and between 18^th and 20^th October 1986 occupied the Hathungla Ridge above the Sumdorong Chu, overlooking the Chinese positions. A full strength brigade was deployed. Unlike the mistakes of 1962, the Indian troops never tried to hold the river line, but stood firm on high ground. By the time the Chinese crossed the Sumdorong Chu and moved forward they found well entrenched Indian troops on the ridge line. The Chinese could neither go forward nor could they retreat, for a retreat would have been rather galling. Similarly Indian troops moved with speed and alacrity and deployed Tanks both in Ladakh and north Sikkim. Clearly the Chinese had not anticipated such moves and attempted bluster in the hope that the new Indian leadership of PM Rajiv Gandhi might wilt.

    On 15^th November 1986 the Chinese sought a flag meeting in which it was agreed that force would not be used and that both sides would seek a “political solution”. Having successfully held the Chinese, the Indian side detected an opening that they had been looking for to convert Arunachal Pradesh from a Union Territory to a full- fledged state of the Indian Union. Earlier there had been apprehension that if India did so the Chinese reaction might be violent and therefore this factor had to be taken into account. The government of India now moved with speed and alacrity and after all legal formalities were completed, the new state of Arunachal Pradesh as a constituent of the Indian Union came into being in February 1987. A forceful message had been sent to the Chinese.

   As anticipated the Chinese reacted with verbal rage, but could not do much more as the Indian army was already fully deployed and ready at the borders. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] issued a strong protest stating that “the establishment of an Indian state on Chinese territory illegally occupied constituted serious aggression against China’s sovereignty and deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and that China would never recognize the so-called Arunachal Pradesh”. This high voltage reaction clearly indicated that their annoyance with India was at its peak, for being out maneuvered both politically and militarily. It was noticed from reports that the Chinese Military Attaché in Delhi, the Tibet District Military Commander and the Chengdu Regional Military Commander were all transferred; perhaps for misreading the situation. It was under these circumstances that the new state of Arunachal Pradesh was born as a full member of the Indian Union.  

  [ In Part-II the international reactions and policies of the then two great powers, the US and the then Soviet Union would be explained.]    

        

Abduction of Billionaire Xiao Jianhua and Corruption in China

      

       Chinese billionaire business tycoon Xiao Jianhua is no ordinary run of the mill businessman. That Xiao was “abducted” from his luxury flat from Hong Kong by Chinese State Security officials and taken to the Mainland, immediately raised antennas about the persona of Xiao Jianhua. Interestingly, Xiao is presently a Canadian citizen and carries a diplomatic passport of Antigua and Barbuda and probably never imagined that he would be whisked away from Hong Kong. That the Chinese state security officials would go to such lengths shows the importance of the man. He is reportedly the person who has over the years been identified as the “front-man” for business dealings of elite Chinese politicians, party hacks and senior government officials. Fairly young at 46 years old, Xiao was a student leader during the Tiananmen crack-down in 1989 and who sided with the government. He has never looked back since then and is presently reportedly worth US$5.8 billion; which makes him the thirty-second wealthiest Chinese tycoon businessman. His companies have shares in banks, insurance, coal, cement and are amalgamated under the banner of “Tomorrow Group” and are listed on the Chinese stock market.

    That this was no ordinary abduction, but perhaps something more, is bolstered by the fact that in 2012,  a company co-owned by Xiao, bought shares worth US$ 2.4 million from Qi Qiaoqiao and Deng Jiagui; the sister and brother-in –law of the Chinese President Xi Jinping. Later he admitted to NYT that he had “helped” the family of Xi Jinping. He also reportedly helped Zeng Wei, the son of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] Vice Chairman Zeng Qinghong, to acquire Shandong Luneng, a State power company that was subsequently privatized. CCP Vice- Chairman Zeng is reportedly politically close to the former Chinese President, Jiang Zemin.

   The abduction of Xiao Jianhua raises a larger question. Is China’s anti- graft drive, so assiduously pursued by President Xi Jinping, merely a cover for getting rid of political opponents or is it actually a drive to eliminate graft from the Chinese system? Very early on in his innings as President beginning 2012, Xi Jinping had made the elimination of corruption from the Chinese political system as one of his important policy imperatives. The feeling was that corruption was slowly eroding the Communist State system, with a concomitant threat to the very existence of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP]. As it is the CCP Central Discipline and Inspection Commission reported that in 2016 about 11,000 corrupt officials were prosecuted, but significantly this figure represented a drop of about 20 per cent from those that were prosecuted in 2015.  This fall in the number prosecuted was seen as representing a winding down of the anti-corruption movement, just prior to the forthcoming Party Congress later this autumn, where Xi is expected to be confirmed for a second term and a new standing committee of the politburo nominated. In fact only President Xi Jinping and the Premier Li Keqiang are expected to retain their respective positions, out of the existing seven standing committee politburo members. It may be recalled that the real rulers of China are the seven standing committee members of the politburo. The significance of the choice being made now lies in the fact that the next CCP leader to replace Xi Jinping at the next party congress in in 1922, would also be expected to be identified from within the new standing committee members of the politburo now nominated.

    Could the abduction therefore of Xiao Jianhua be linked to murky maneuverings that are taking place within the ruling CCP leadership groups, as to who would be the eventual successor to Xi Jinping as President?  One of the easiest methods to eliminate a potential rival would be to paint him with the tar of corruption. In China the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences has estimated that the liquid assets of State Owned Enterprises [SOEs] and cash generated by land sales of the Chinese state to be about US$ 4 trillion. It is not difficult to envisage that important officials, holding extensive power, are able to easily access this cash. Even those Chinese officials, who are under investigation, continue to serve and often are even promoted. At present the Chinese judicial system is rather weak and subject to CCP guidelines and therefore cannot be considered to be independent. Without a free press, it is the word of the CCP Central Discipline and Investigation Commission that counts as the ultimate arbiter of the fate of a “corrupt” official. And the Central Commission is fully under the control of who- ever is the Party leader; in this case President Xi Jinping who operates through Wang Qishan, the politburo standing committee member in charge of anti-corruption.

     Within Chinese ruling circles the need for “stability” to the run up to the 19^th Party Congress later this autumn is seen as a paramount requirement. Thus even Xie Zhenjiang was removed from his post of Chairman of the Beijing based Securities Daily, as he was seen as to close to Xiao Jianhua. The charge against Xie was that he had the potential to create “instability” in the Chinese Stock market in conjunction with the extensive holdings of Xiao’s companies listed on the stock exchange. The Chinese political system cannot sustain the melt down of the stock exchange as had happened earlier. It would be a severe indictment of the present ruling group.

  Therefore the main beneficiary of the arrest and abduction of Xiao Jianhua is likely to be Wang Qishan, the standing committee member of the politburo in charge of the Central Discipline and Investigation Commission and who is a very close political associate of President Xi Jinping. In fact speculation abounds that if Wang is able to ensure “stability” in the run up to the 19^th Party Congress, then his chances for promotion are considerably brightened. The question therefore still remains moot whether the abduction of Xiao Jianhua from Hong Kong was linked to an anti-corruption drive, or was it linked to the political maneuverings that are going on in Chinese political system just prior to the CCP Congress? 

PLAYING THE TAIWANESE CARD

         

       When the People’s Republic of China was proclaimed by Mao Zedung on 1 October 1949, the new Chinese leadership was very clear on one aspect. Speaking to the then Soviet Ambassador Roschin, on 1 January 1950, Mao clarified that any state that was sincere in establishing diplomatic relations must first ‘completely break all [emphasis added] ties with Jiang Jieshi [Chiang Kaishek] unconditionally, refuse any kind of support and assistance to this regime making it an official declaration. It was only under those conditions that a state could send a delegation for negotiations for establishing diplomatic relations. Mao made no distinction for any state and India too had to follow Mao’s dictum.

    As far as recognition of the new Chinese regime was concerned, it was the Attlee government in London that took the lead. On 22 October 1949, Sir Esler Dening submitted a note to PM Attlee that the recognition of the new Communist government of China ‘cannot be said to be contrary to the principles and practices of international law’. On 27 October 1949 the British Cabinet approved the note and Attlee sent it to all Commonwealth governments, including India, for consideration. The British government note did not seek any assurance from the new Chinese government on whether it intended to honor all previous international obligations made by previous governments of China. The British explained away this aberration by saying that ‘the disadvantages of non- recognition were so great so as to outweigh any possible advantages to be obtained from securing Chinese assurances…’. On 18 December 1949, Attlee conveyed to Nehru that the British government intended to recognize the new Chinese government on 2 January 1950. Nehru whose personal inclinations were wholly in tune with British thinking, readily agreed; but insisted that India would recognize the new People’s Republic on 1 January 1950. Nothing was asked for in return.    

     But the Chinese were not finished just yet. They clarified that while recognition was one aspect, establishing diplomatic relations was quite another. Thus India was asked to send a delegation to Beijing to negotiate setting up diplomatic relations, as were the British. The Chinese made two demands. First, India must clarify what it intended to do with KMT Chinese properties in India and secondly it must ‘explain’ its voting patterns in the UN. For once even Nehru baulked at these untenable ‘demands’ and declined. Realizing their folly rather quickly and the felt need to keep Nehru on their side, as they were about to ‘invade’ Tibet, the Chinese quickly changed track and agreed to establish diplomatic relations with India on 15 March 1950. The British were kept waiting for years!

      Let us now fast forward to 1972. When Nixon visited China, the Chinese insisted on one core demand. The US must recognize that Taiwan was a part of China. As per the 1979 US-PRC Joint Communique, the US switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In the Joint Communique, the US recognized the Government of the People's Republic of China as the sole legal government of China [emphasis added], acknowledging the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. This principle is enshrined in the two subsequent joint communiques that followed. The Joint Communique also stated that the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. So when President Trump raised the specter of not following the ‘one China’ principle, it caused considerable consternation within the Chinese leadership. Of course, since then suitable amends have been made by the US and the ‘one China’ principle reiterated in a phone conversation between President Trump and President Xi Jinping. It must have come as a great relief to the Chinese leadership.

    However international law is sufficiently opaque on the subject and if a state wishes to exploit the loop holes; these are available. International law makes a clear distinction between the recognition of a state, as opposed to the recognition of a government. For example, India recognized the state of Israel ever since its inception, but did not recognize or establish diplomatic relations with the government of Israel till many years later. The fact remains that hardly any state disputes that Taiwan is indeed Chinese Territory. The Taiwan authorities say so themselves. But the indisputable fact is that the People’s Republic does not exercise administrative control over the whole of Chinese Territory, but only does so on the mainland and over some island territories. Taiwan remains outside its administrative control. China is the only P-5 state that does not exercise full administrative control over its entire territory [emphasis added]. Therefore the question that remains is: what should the nature of relations be that outside powers can establish with the authorities exercising administrative control in the area of Taiwan?

    It goes without saying that establishing full diplomatic relations is ruled out, since few states recognize the Taiwan authorities as the legitimate government of China. Few states would also like to risk bearing the wrath of China and its military and economic clout. Nevertheless, day to day dealings have to take place with the Taiwan authorities. The 1979 US-PRC Joint Communique also states that the people of the United States will maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The American Institute in Taiwan [AIT] and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office [TECRO] does just that. Similarly India maintains representation in Taiwan under the India-Taipei Association [ITA], as does Japan and 72 other states. The Chinese authorities have had no objection to the participation of Taiwanese in the Olympics and other international events as Chinese [Taipei]. Short of official diplomatic functions at government to government level, these offices perform all other duties such as issuing visas, promoting trade etc. What if the US and all other states together, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, were to change these innocuous names of their offices and start calling them as “Representative Office of the United States” or “The Representative Office of India” and so on? The Chinese would be certainly miffed, but it would reflect reality and would not in any case contravene any international law.  

      Last year the Chinese President Xi Jinping took the unprecedented step of meeting the former Taiwanese President, who was then still in office, in Singapore. Both met as party leaders with no mention by either side of their official designations. Therefore it follows that other state leaders could also possibly meet the Taiwanese President as party leaders, in third countries, without risking any possible Chinese reproach. It has not been tried so far by any other state leader, but the precedent is there. Should such a meeting take place, it would severely test Chinese resolve, but it would begin to give the Taiwanese an international personality.

    It must however be emphasized that playing the Taiwan card would certainly invite Chinese ire, which could prove quite costly, since China is a great power and has the capacity to inflict considerable damage. It is a 'core' issue for the Chinese. But if the Chinese continue to push their agenda aggressively, particularly in the South China Sea [SCS] area, they should also be made aware that other states in the region, and particularly in conjunction with the US, are not completely bereft of options. The Taiwanese card is always there.

Dealing With China--Part III

                                                    

                        Proposal for merging OBOR with India’s Act East Policy [AEP

 

         In his remarks at Mumbai recently the Chinese Ambassador Luo Zhaohui made the third of his proposals in that he advocated the merging of China’s ‘One Belt One Road’ [OBOR] concept with India’s ‘Act East Policy’ [AEP]. The first two of his proposals have already been dealt with in Parts I and II of ‘Dealing with China’. It is not in the public domain if any of these proposals have been formally presented to South Block and if so in what form. Nevertheless, this too is an important initiative and deserves to be studied very carefully and responded to in the course of time.

      When the Chinese Ambassador spoke of the OBOR what exactly did he have in mind? Does it mean that the OBOR initiative also includes the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC] as an inseparable component? A clear understanding of what is on offer would assist in the study of the implications of the proposal and facilitate a response from India.

      On 7 September 2013, President Xi Jinping while addressing the Nazarbayev University made the proposal for a new Silk Road Economic Belt and later while addressing the Indonesian Parliament on 3 October 2013, proposed the new 21^st Century Maritime Silk Road. In time both these initiatives were amalgamated and became known as the ‘OBOR’ concept. The present Chinese leadership has done well to choose this name, the Silk Road, for no matter where located in the Asian heartland, the name would always find resonance. The Chinese believe that the OBOR provides a fresh way of thinking about regional and global cooperation and that by including both bilateral and multilateral cooperation in political, economic, cultural and other fields; a new paradigm would be created. Not without reason the OBOR concept takes care of China's over- capacity in steel and cement industries, as well as the desire for utilizing accumulated capital resources to further Chinese ambitions. Its scope would not be limited to Asia only, but certainly its success does, to some extent, depend on co-operation that the Chinese receive from important countries such as India. If this initiative of the Chinese authorities comes to fruition, it would link 65 countries and 4.4 billion people.

    The Indian position has been that it has never been officially consulted on the OBOR. The assumption in India is that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor [CPEC], in which the Chinese have invested US$ 46 billion, is an important component part of the OBOR.  In December 2014, EAM stated in Parliament that ‘the government was aware that China’s involvement in the construction of or assistance to infrastructure projects, including hydroelectric and nuclear projects, highways, motorways, export processing zones and economic corridors in Pakistan. Government has seen reports with regard to China and Pakistan being involved in infrastructure building activities in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir [POK] including construction of CPEC. Government has conveyed its concern to China about their activities and asked them to cease such activities’. While EAM was expressing her concern, a PTI report quoted the Indian High Commissioner to Pakistan, as saying that ‘India has no worry over construction of the CPEC, as an economically strong Pakistan would bring stability to the region’.

      This dichotomy of approach still remains to be reconciled for it seems that it stems from strategic ambiguity. If the past is any guide then in 1965 at Tashkent, India agreed to restore the 1949 Cease Fire Line [CFL] and withdrew from areas it occupied across the CFL in the 1965 conflict. Similarly the whole ethos of the Simla Agreement in 1972 was that Pakistan would accept and at an appropriate time convert the CFL [now LC] into an international border. In 1999 as well, India maintained the sanctity of the LC, never crossed the line militarily and forced Pakistani troops to withdraw back and beyond the LC. Thus it seems that India was quite prepared to give up its claims to Pakistan Occupied Kashmir [POK], if Pakistan accepted the LC as an international border. It is not in the public domain if any such concrete offer was ever made in writing to Pakistan. On the other hand, PM Modi recently reiterated in his 15^th August Independence message that POK was indeed sovereign Indian Territory. The question is which of the two strategic modules would India prefer to pursue on long term basis?

    Thus if the CPEC is indeed a vital component of OBOR, then it violates Indian Territory and for India to accept OBOR is a matter of national territorial integrity. On the question of the CPEC traversing POK, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying prevaricated on the issue and stated that ‘with regard to whether the economic corridor passes through [Pak] Kashmir, as far as I have learnt a joint committee for the construction of CPEC has been established and a second meeting has been held coinciding with the visit of the Pak President. I do not know if they have talked about whether the corridor will pass through this region [Pak-Kashmir], but I can tell you that we hope the Kashmir issue can be resolved through consultations and negotiations between India and Pakistan’. Clearly the Chinese were hoping to obfuscate the issue of POK and the fact that the CPEC passed through this region. Recent Chinese press reports have also taken the same view, calling upon India and Pakistan to settle the matter amongst themselves. 

     Therefore if India cannot join OBOR then the Chinese Ambassador’s proposal of joining the OBOR with India’s AEP clearly becomes a non –starter. Alternatively at present, India does not have sufficient economic resources or the political heft to put in place either a competitive or an alternative connectivity networks, on a scale that can offer an alternative option to the OBOR. In such circumstances would it be plausible to prudently study those components of the OBOR that may improve India’s own connectivity to major markets and just as India has chosen to join the AIIB and the NDB, also join those components of OBOR that suit India’s needs? For example, India’s proposal to build a road cum rail link to Central Asia through the Iranian port of Chahbahar could ostensibly be linked to the Chinese built routes in the Central Asian region to obtain access to both Central Asian as well as Russian destinations. Would the Chinese be prepared for allowing limited participation by India in OBOR as opposed to full participation?

        If India’s resources are indeed limited then it automatically follows that strategically these must not be spread too thin as a part of its AEP. As the Indian Ocean area is strategically extremely important for India, it may be more imperative to deploy resources to build an Indian Ocean network of ports, with connecting highways and rail routes, such as the planned Mekong-Ganga corridor and the Sittwe-Mizoram multi-modal transport corridor. Plans to develop the deep water port on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast, Trincomalee, as a major energy and transport hub are still in limbo, despite the fact that the Chinese have gone ahead and built Hambantota port in Sri Lanka and expanded the Colombo port. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands are strategically located in the Bay of Bengal and opposite the Malacca Straits and yet, India continues to treat these islands as a distant outposts rather than developing them as important commercial and transportation hubs. The idea of launching a Spice Route, Cotton Route and even a Mausam project are, at present, mostly rhetorical ripostes to China’s OBOR and to the CPEC. Much more therefore needs to be done. At some point in time strategic choices would have to be made. For the present it seems that strategic ambiguity would perhaps continue.