A few days ago the 31st
Anniversary [1986] of the establishment of Arunachal Pradesh as a full- fledged
state of the Indian Union was celebrated with much enthusiasm and acclaim, but
its birth was accompanied by high end tension in Sino-Indian relations and what
its establishment also demonstrated was that a substantive shift in great power
relations had also occurred.
North East Frontier Agency [NEFA] as the territory was then known was a
Union Territory and subject to substantive sovereignty claims by China over
large tracts, amounting to nearly 90,000 square kilometers. Although in 1914 at
the tripartite Simla Convention [India, Tibet and China] the McMahon Line
separating Tibet from India had been agreed upon, China insisted that it had
never agreed to the McMahon Line. Yet from that point onwards in time till 23
January 1959, the Chinese government, in any official document, never
challenged the McMahon Line. Even when Major Khating evicted the last of the
Tibetans from Tawang on 12 February 1951, there was no protest from the Chinese
government. In his letter to Nehru, PM Zhou Enlai on 23 January 1959 affirmed
that “the Chinese government finds it necessary to take a realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line”. But times
change and so do policies. Let us fast forward to the early 1980s.
In early 1980s PM Indira Gandhi took the decision that Indian security
forces were to patrol right up to the McMahon Line so as to eliminate any
chance of incursions across the line. A small detachment began patrolling the
area from the summer of 1982. There were no Chinese protests when movement by
Indian personnel was made in 1983 and on 28 July 1984 a seasonal post was
established. However in 1986 when Indian personnel similarly moved up to the
post after the winter was over, they found 40 Chinese personnel already
encamped there and were soon reinforced by about 200 PLA soldiers. From 26 June
1986 onwards, a bitter exchange of protests took place, but a solution was not
forthcoming. India was clearly alarmed at this new found Chinese aggressiveness
coming as it did after Chinese Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs, Liu Shuqing
told us at the 6th Round of Boundary talks in November 1985 that
“India would have to give concessions in the eastern sector and China would do
so in the western sector”. What these concessions were was not amplified at
that time.
Clearly recognizing the gravity of the situation the Indian Army moved quickly
and in strength and between 18th and 20th October 1986
occupied the Hathungla Ridge above the Sumdorong Chu, overlooking the Chinese
positions. A full strength brigade was deployed. Unlike the mistakes of 1962,
the Indian troops never tried to hold the river line, but stood firm on high
ground. By the time the Chinese crossed the Sumdorong Chu and moved forward
they found well entrenched Indian troops on the ridge line. The Chinese could
neither go forward nor could they retreat, for a retreat would have been rather
galling. Similarly Indian troops moved with speed and alacrity and deployed
Tanks both in Ladakh and north Sikkim. Clearly the Chinese had not anticipated
such moves and attempted bluster in the hope that the new Indian leadership of
PM Rajiv Gandhi might wilt.
On 15th November 1986 the Chinese sought a flag meeting in
which it was agreed that force would not be used and that both sides would seek
a “political solution”. Having successfully held the Chinese, the Indian side
detected an opening that they had been looking for to convert Arunachal Pradesh
from a Union Territory to a full- fledged state of the Indian Union. Earlier
there had been apprehension that if India did so the Chinese reaction might be
violent and therefore this factor had to be taken into account. The government
of India now moved with speed and alacrity and after all legal formalities were
completed, the new state of Arunachal Pradesh as a constituent of the Indian
Union came into being in February 1987. A forceful message had been sent to the
Chinese.
As anticipated the Chinese reacted with verbal rage, but could not do
much more as the Indian army was already fully deployed and ready at the
borders. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs [MFA] issued a strong protest
stating that “the establishment of an Indian state on Chinese territory
illegally occupied constituted serious aggression against China’s sovereignty
and deeply hurt the feelings of the Chinese people and that China would never
recognize the so-called Arunachal Pradesh”. This high voltage reaction clearly
indicated that their annoyance with India was at its peak, for being out
maneuvered both politically and militarily. It was noticed from reports that
the Chinese Military Attaché in Delhi, the Tibet District Military Commander
and the Chengdu Regional Military Commander were all transferred; perhaps for
misreading the situation. It was under these circumstances that the new state
of Arunachal Pradesh was born as a full member of the Indian Union.
[ In Part-II the international reactions and policies of the then two great powers, the US and the then Soviet Union would be explained.]
Super Post.. well written.. gripping.. waiting for the next part..
ReplyDeleteGreat recount. Wonderful to revisit the days of historical significance.
ReplyDeleteGreat recount. Wonderful to revisit the days of historical significance. Eagerly await the next part.
ReplyDeleteGreat recording of history and international strategy sadly lacking in
ReplyDeleteThe 21st century indian diplomacy and strategy
Great recording of history and international strategy sadly lacking in
ReplyDeleteThe 21st century indian diplomacy and strategy